Credence Goods, Risk Averse, and Optimal Insurance by Ouyang, Yaofu
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Credence Goods, Risk Averse, and
Optimal Insurance
Yaofu Ouyang
University of International Business and Economics
March 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70392/
MPRA Paper No. 70392, posted 2 April 2016 12:49 UTC
Credence Goods, Risk Averse, and
Optimal Insurance
Yaofu Ouyangy
March 31, 2016
Abstract
We analyze a credence goods market with risk averse consumers when the as-
sumptions of both liability and veriability hold. In the basic model, we show that
the consumer's risk-aversion would induce expert's overtreatment behavior and thus
cause social ineciency. But the probability of overtreating deceases with the de-
gree of consumer's risk-aversion or the coecient of absolute risk aversion(CRRA).
Furthermore, we extend the basic model with insurance option. We assume there
exists a perfectly competitive insurance market where the consumer could purchase
insurance. Two sets of equilibria indexed by expert's pricing strategy could be spec-
ied. The equilibrium outcome shows that social eciency could always be achieved
and the expert could obtain all the social surplus in the equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
When the consumers search for some repair services, the service providers have more
information about the nature of consumer's problem and the corresponding treatments.
The goods or services that bear this property that seller gets better information than the
buyer is credence goods1. The consumers barely know what they need ex ante, and even
can not verify ex post. Credence goods is very common, such as medical service, education.
Three types of fraudulent behaviours could be induced by the information superiority
of service providers, providing unnecessary expensive treatment, charging the price for
the treatment actually unprovided and provide insucient treatment. The literature
entitles these three types of frauds as overtreatment, overcharging and undertreatment,
respectively. For instance, the car owners are recommended with unnecessary repairs by
employees of Sears Automotive Centers in 90% of the test cases in the United States(see
Emons (1997)). There still are numerous other examples about the expert's fraud2
Researches in credence goods mainly focus on the inuences of three aspects on the
market performance, the consumers' characteristics, the experts' features and market
circumstances and regulations. As our paper focuses on the impact of consumer's risk-
aversion on the credence goods market, the discussions about the researches into the later
two aspects are deliberately omitted3. We direct all of our attentions to researches on
consumer's characteristics. Within a model of strategic information transmission, Pitchik
and Schotter(1987) study whether the amount of frauds would decrease as the consumer's
and expert's preference become more similar. Fong(2005) considers heterogeneous con-
sumers in terms of the valuation for repair of major problem and analyses who might be
more susceptible to the expert's fraudulent behaviors. The results show that consumers
with high valuation are more likely to be victims of fraud, which later is testied in Hynd-
man and Ozerturk(2011). Recently, Bester and Dahm(2014) nd that rst-best outcome
1See the denition in Darby and Karni (1973)
2See Pesendorfer and Wolinsky(2003), Emons(1997), Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006), Bester and
Dahm(2014).
3The papers about expert's features: Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009), Liu(2011), Beck, et al(2013);
the papers about institutions: Ekelund and Jackson(2003), Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006), Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2011), Fong, et al(2014).
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can always be achieved when the consumer's delay cost or discount rate is zero, although
the increase of discount rate would impose some restrictions on the parameters.
The other two papers are closely relate to the problem under concern. Sulzle and
Wambach(2005) investigate the inuence of consumers' coinsurance rate on the expert's
honesty. They add the insurance into the simplied version of credence goods model in
Pesendorfer and Wolinsky(2003). In their model, there exists many prot-maximizing
experts in the market and the consumer can search for second opinion whenever the
current relationship is broken. The price for treatments is xed and exogenously given.
On contrast, in our model the expert is a monopoly and have pricing power and no second
opinion is allowed. Besides, they assume that the types of treatment is not veriable for
the consumer, then the fraud takes the form of overcharging, while in our model we assume
that both liability and veriability holds and study the expert's overtreatment. More
importantly, in Sulzle and Wambach's model, the coinsurance rate is exogenously given,
while we assume that the insurance choice is endogenously decided by the consumer's
optimal strategy. Then the consumer may deliberate on the coinsurance rate, and avoid
the adverse eect of a higher coinsurance rate in their model.
Under a standard expert model of credence goods in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)
with risk-averse consumers, Bonroy, et al (2013)analyse the impacts of consumer's risk-
aversion on expert's incentive to diagnosis, but no formal discussions about consumer's
insurance are carried in their paper. Therefore, many interesting questions remains u-
nanswered. How would the consumers' risk-aversion of consumer inuence the experts
treatment behavior? Whether social eciency could be achieved or not? What would
be consumers' optimal insurance choice? What is the consumer's insurance impact on
expert's behavior? whether insurance could improve the social welfare or not?
This paper considers a standard model of credence goods with risk-averse consumer.
Comparing to overcharging problem in Sulzle and Wambach(2005) and diagnosis problem
in Bonroy, et al(2013), we focus on expert's overtreatment behaviour. We assume that
both liability and veriability hold and the expert could costless diagnose the nature of
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the consumer's problem. The expert is a monopoly in the market, and he could price the
treatments and propose a take-it-or-leave-it oer. The consumer is homogenous and risk
averse. In extensive model, we extend that the consumer could purchase insurance after
observing the expert's price list and insurance scheme posted by the insurer. We study
the consumer's optimal insurance choice and its possible impact on expert's overtreatment
and thus the market eciency. Diering from the model in Sulzle and Wambach(2005),
we model the expert-consumer relationship as a one-shot game and no second opinion is
possible and the insurance is also endogenously chosen by consumer. In order to concen-
trate on the consumer's insurance choice, we assume that the insurance market is perfectly
competitive and then the insurance is actually fair.
In basic model, we show that consumer's risk aversion could induce expert's overtreat-
ment and then cause social ineciency and the degree of consumer's risk-aversion would
aect the expert's overtreatment behaviour. But the probability of overtreatment de-
creases with the degree of consumer's risk-aversion or the coecient of absolute risk
aversion(CRRA). Furthermore, when the consumer is extremely risk-averse, the expert
would behave honestly and the market eciency could be achieved.
In extensive model, the consumer could purchase actually fair insurance provided by a
competitive insurance company. Two sets of equilibria indexed by expert's pricing strategy
could be specied. The equilibrium outcome shows that social eciency could always be
achieved and the expert would obtain all the social surplus in the equilibrium. In one
set of equilibria, the expert posts a price list with price margin from major treatment
being larger than that from minor treatment. The expert's equilibrium prots equal
to the price margin from minor treatment and the consumer would purchase as much
insurance as possible. Interestingly, the expert could grab all the social surplus facilitated
by the insurance purchased by the consumer, which acts as the tunnel that transports the
consumer's surplus from major problem to minor treatment. Optimally, the consumer's
insurance choice would make the expert honestly treat his problem, and in turn the expert
post a optimal price list to capture all the social surplus, and the social eciency could
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be implemented in the equilibrium.
The other set of equilibria relates to the situation where the experts posts a price list
with prots from major treatment being smaller than that from minor treatment. Under
such a price list, the expert credibly commits to honestly repair consumer's problem, and
then the consumer would purchase full insurance and ends up with the same utility level
no matter which type his problem turns out to be. Again, the insurance acts as a surplus-
grabbing device. Since the consumer would always purchase full insurance and gets the
same utility in both states, leaving no rents for the consumer in one states (e.x. minor
problem) means grabbing all the surplus in the two states. Therefore, the expert need
only post a price list that make the consumer with minor problem is indierent between
accepting and rejecting the treatment oer, and then could obtain all possible surplus.
Actually, the expert indeed has the incentive to post such a price list as a honesty signal
because all possible surplus could be captured under the price list.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the standard
credence goods model with risk-averse consumer and analyses the equilibrium. Section
3 extends the basic model by introducing the insurance company and the equilibria are
solved. Section 4 makes some discussions and then concludes.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Players and Payo Function
There is a monopoly expert(she) and a consumer(he). The consumer has a problem r
either being minor m or serious S, r 2 fm;Sg. r = S with probability , with  2 (0; 1).
If the consumer's problem r 2 fm;Sg is resolved, the consumer could gain a gross of
Vr, otherwise he gets 0. The consumer is risk-averse and his utility function follows a
concave Von Neumann-Morgenstern form U(x) which is twice dierentiable with U(0) = 0,
U
0
() > 0 and U 00() < 0, where x being the consumer's net gain. So the consumer's utility
is U(Vb P ) if his problem b is resolved at price P , and U( P ) if his problem is unresolved
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with treatment at price P . The reserve utility of the consumer is U > 0.
The expert can privately learn the nature of the consumer's problem by costless di-
agnosis and then make a prescription d for the consumer: major treatment H or minor
treatment L,i.e, d 2 fL;Hg. Prescription d = H repairs both types of problems while
prescription d = L only repairs a minor problem. The cost of performing a treatment
d for the expert are Cd. Suppose the expert is a prot maximizer and her utility from
performing a treatment at price P is P   Cd, otherwise her payo is 0. Meanwhile, we
also assume that overtreatment will induce the same cost of treating the major problem
for the expert4.
Suppose that it is socially ecient to repair both problem with proper treatment while
not ecient to repair minor problem by major treatment,i.e.,0 < CL < Vm < CH < VS.
Suppose major treatment is potentially more protable than minor treatment for the
expert5. Also, we assume that it is not optimal for the consumer to always accepting
major treatment, i.e, U(VS  CH) + (1  )U(Vm CH) < U6. Furthermore, we restrict
any price list (PL; PH) to satisfy Pd  Cd for all d 2 fL;Hg, which means that the expert
can not cross-subsidise between the two treatment.
Following the literature, we dene the following terms
Definition 1. Liability: The resolution of consumer's problem is veriable costless ex
post. Veriability: The type of treatment the consumer receives is veriable costless.
By Liability, if the consumer's problem is not resolved after treatment, the expert
could be heavily ned. Then, the expert could not providing minor treatment for the
consumer with major problem,i.e, undertreatment could be excluded. By Veriability,
the expert can not provide a minor (major) treatment while charging a price for major
4This assumption can be easily extended to the situation that overtreatment only induce a friction of
cost for major treatment. overtreatment is actually the situation that the expert privately learns that
the consumer's problem is minor, So the expert only need x the consumer's problem whilst make the
consumer believe that he have performed a major treatment. Therefore, overtreatment in some cases
may be less costly than actually performing a major treatment.
5We would like use the minor treatment as the base line to study the expert's incentive to overtreat-
ment. Since there are only two cases, then it is a symmetric problem to focus on the expert's incentive
to undertreatment,i.e, provide insuciently minor treatment for major problem, which could only be
possible when the assumption liability dened below is not held.
6Other cases will be discussed in later sections.
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(minor) treatment,i.e, overcharging could be excluded. In the our model we assume both
the assumptions of liability and veriability hold.
Timing of the Game. The game proceeds as follows:
1. The expert posts a price list (PL; PH).
2. Nature draws the consumer's type. The consumer visits the expert. The expert
performs a diagnosis and prescribes a treatment d 2 f?; L;Hg for the consumer. ?
here means the expert could reject to treat the consumer.
3. The consumer decides whether accept treatment d or not. If the consumer accepts,
the treatment prescribed would be performed by the expert. If the problem is
resolved, the expert receives her payment otherwise get nothing7. The game ends
in other situations.
2.2 Equilibrium
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is analyzed below. An equilibrium consists of the ex-
pert's strategy, the consumer's strategy, and the consumer's beliefs over the nature of
problem, which satisfy the following:
1. The consumer's strategy maximizes her expect payo given her beliefs.
2. The expert's strategy maximizes his expected utility given the consumer's strategy.
3. The consumer's beliefs are correct on the equilibrium path.
The consumer's strategy species the acceptance probability regarding to the expert's rec-
ommendation. Note that as long as the assumption liability holds, undertreatment would
be excluded as mentioned above. The expert would only recommend minor treatment for
the consumer with minor problem. And the consumer would believe that his problem is
7Here the payment for the expert is based on the resolution of the consumer's problem, so the liability
holds. We think that it may be regarded as enough penalty for the expert's undertreatment behaviour.
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indeed minor upon recommended minor treatment. Accepting the prescription at price
PL would bring the consumer with benets of Vm, resulting in the consumer's utility being
U(Vm   PL), while rejecting it retains the reserve utility U .
Denote P L and P

H that satisfy U(Vm   P L) = U and U(VS   P H) = U , respectively.
Then P L and P

H are the maximal prices at which the consumer would accept the treatment
oer when he could make sure that his problem is minor and major, respectively. Any
prices larger than the maximal prices would make the consumer reject and no transaction
would be reached, which is suboptimal for the expert. So we restrict the prices with
PL  P L and PH  P H .
Then as long as PL  P L with U(Vm   P L) = U , the consumer would accept the
minor treatment prescription with probability one8. Denote  as the probability of the
consumer accepting major treatment.
The expert's strategy consists of posting a price list fPL; PHg and a prescription
strategy d 2 f?; L;Hg. For the consumer with serious problem,i.e, r = S, the expert
has to prescribe major treatment (d = M) since the consumer's payment is based on
the resolution of his problem and only major treatment could repair serious problem.
Let  be the probability of prescribing major treatment for the consumer with minor
problem,i.e.attempt to overtreat the consumer.
Lemma 1. There exists no equilibrium where the expert posts a single price PL = PH = P
or a price list fPL; PHg with PH 2 [CH ; CH + PL   CL).
Proof. The proof can be divided into two parts: the rst part shows that there exists no
equilibrium with a single price PL = PH = P and the second part proves that a price list
fPL; PHg with PH 2 [CH ; CH + PL   CL) can not be optimal for the expert.
1. Assume that there is indeed a equilibrium where the expert posts a single price
PL = PH = P . If P < CH , then the expert would reject the consumer with serious
problem. The consumer updates his belief that the expert would oer to treat him
8Assume that the consumer would accept the prescription when he is indierent between accepting
and rejecting the oer.
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only when his problem is minor. Then for the expert's oer at such a single price, the
consumer believe that his problem is minor with probability one and expected gain
from the treatment is Vm. Therefore, the consumer would only accept the treatment
at price P  P  and reject any treatment at price P > P . So the expert's maximal
prots m = (1   )( P    CL). However, the expert can always post a price list
fPL; PHg with PL = P  and PH = CH +  ( ! 0). Overtreatment is not protable
for the expert under such a price list, then the consumer would accept both major
and minor treatment prescriptions with probability one. The expert's prots are
+ (1  )( P  CL) > m. Therefore, the single price list P < CH is suboptimal.
If P  CH , although the expert would oer to treat the consumer in both states
but no information about the consumer's problem could be updated from the price
list and expert's recommendation, the consumer maintains his prior belief and the
expected utility from treatment is U(VM   PH) + (1   )U(Vm   PH) < U , then
the consumer would reject the treatment with probability one. Then the market
breaks down and the expert make no prots, which makes the price suboptimal.
2. For the price list fPL; PHg with PH 2 [CH ; CH + PL   CL), it is strictly dominated
strategy for the expert because the expert could strictly increase his prots by
posting a price list fPL; CH + PL   CLg. This is because the consumer holds the
belief that the expert would honestly treat him as long as PH  CH +PL CL and
both liability and veriability holds9, so the consumer would accept the expert's
recommendation, either major or minor treatment, with probability one. Then the
expert's prots are (PH  CH)+ (1 )(PL CL). The prots under any price list
fPL; PHg with PH 2 [CH ; CH+PL CL) are (PH CH)+(1 )(PL CL) < PL CL,
the prots under price list fPL; PHg with PH = CH + PL   CL. Therefore, such a
price list is also suboptimal.
9Assume that the expert would honestly treat the consumer when he is indierent between honestly
treating and overtreating.
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Lemma 1 shows that some constraints can be put on the equilibrium price. Firstly, a
single price is not feasible on the equilibrium. If the single price is too low to compensate
the expert's cost of major treatment, the expert would reject treating the consumer with
major problem at the price. Then the consumer learns that only minor problem would
be repaired at the price based on this observation, so the consumer would only accepting
a maximal price that leave him reserve utility. The expert can get all the rents from the
consumer with minor problem but give up all the possible rents from the consumer with
major problem, but such a price can not be optimal because the expert could always post
a price list that get extra rents by treating the consumer with major problem. While if
the single price can cover the cost of major treatment. The price is too high to make the
consumer always reject the oer. Therefore, a single price is not optimal.
On the other hand, if the price list satises that the margin from major treatment is
no bigger than that from minor treatment, then the expert would behave honestly and
the consumer would accept the oer for certain. Given the consumer always accepting
expert's oer, expert's prots is increasing in both prices. Then any price lists that makes
the margin from major treatment smaller than that from minor treatment is dominated
by that equals the price margin.
From the two points, we could focus our attention on the price list fPL; PHg with
PH  CH + PL   CL in the equilibrium analysis below.
Lemma 2 (Fully Overtreatment). Given the price list fPL; PHg with PL CL  PH CH ,
there exists no equilibrium where
 = 1;  = 1: (1)
Proof. We shows the result by contradiction. If  = 1, no information is updated and
the consumer retains his prior belief that his problem is major with probability . The
expected utility from accepting the treatment is U(VM   PH) + (1   )U(Vm   PH).
Given the price PL  CL  PH  CH and U(VM  CH) + (1  )U(Vm  CH) < U , then
U(VM   PH) + (1   )U(Vm   PH) < U . Optimally, the consumer should reject the
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treatment oer with probability one,i.e,  = 0.
The lemma 2 establishes that the fully overtreatment could not be a equilibrium. Since
fully overtreatment provides no information updating for the consumer about the nature
of the problem, the consumer retains his prior belief and his acceptance for price of major
treatment is constrained by such belief. As the price for major treatment is too high, the
consumer should reject such a oer with probability one10.
We next direct our attention to mixed strategy equilibrium. Given the price list
fPL; PHg with PL   CL  PH   CH , we compute the consumer's optimal acceptance
strategy  at stage 3. Upon being recommending major treatment, the consumer would
update his belief about the nature of his problem and weigh the price of the treatment
and expected valuation from treatment. The expert would recommend major treatment
in two situations: one where the consumer's problem is serious; the other where the expert
overtreats the consumer with minor problem, and the probability of the two situations is
 and (1   ), respectively. According to Bayes' rule, the consumer nurture the belief
that his problem is minor with probability (1 )
+(1 ) and major with probability

+(1 ) .
If the consumer rejects the expert's recommendation, he would receive his reserve utility
which is U , while if he accepts, his expected utility is
EU =
(1  )U(Vm   PH)
 + (1  ) +
U(VS   PH)
 + (1  ) (2)
Assume that ^ be the probability which makes EU = U , so ^ makes the consumer
indierent between accepting and rejecting the expert's recommendation. By simple
calculations, ^ = (U(VS PH) 
U)
(1 )( U U(Vm PH)) . Given the price list fPL; PHg with PL   CL 
PH CH , the consumer should choose his acceptance probability  = 1 if  < ^ and  = 0
if  > ^. And if  = ^, any  2 [0; 1] is optimal for the consumer.
Backward, we consider the expert's recommendation strategy at stage 2. For the
consumer with minor problem, the expert could either prescribe minor or major treat-
10This argument holds because U(VM   CH) + (1   )U(Vm   CH) < U and PH  CH . PH  CH
because the expert lack of the commitment to provide major treatment by make a negative prot.
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ment,i.e. overtreat or not. Given the price list fPL; PHg, if the expert treats the consumer
honestly,i.e, prescribe a minor treatment, she could make a prot of (H) = PL  CL for
sure, while if she overtreats the consumer,i.e, prescribe a unnecessary major treatment,
her expected prot is (F ) = (PH   CH). So the expert would always overtreats the
consumer if (F ) > (H) while honestly repair the consumer's problem if (F ) < (H),
and he is indierent between overtreatment and honest treatment if (F ) = (H).
Lemma 3 (Partial Overtreatment). Given the price list fPL; PHg with PL CL  PH CH ,
there exists a equilibrium where
 =
PL   CL
PH   CH ; 
 =
(U(VS   PH)  U)
(1  )( U   U(Vm   PH)) (3)
and the expert's expected payo  = (PL   CL)
Proof. 1. Suppose the posted price list satises PL CL  PH CH . Given r = m, the
expert receives (H) = PL CL by recommending d = L and (F ) = (PH CH) by
recommending d = H. Given the consumer's strategy, (H) = (F ), then  2 [0; 1]
is optimal.
Given the expert's strategy, the consumer who decline d = H would retain his
reserve utility U and accept d = H would receive a utility
U(d = H; accept) =

(1  )U(Vm   PH)
 + (1  ) +
U(VS   PH)
 + (1  )

= U = U(d = H; reject): (4)
Then any  2 [0; 1] is an optimal strategy for the consumer. Therefore, for the given
price list, the strategies of the expert and the consumer are mutually best responses.
2. Suppose the strategies in (3) form an equilibrium. For  2 [0; 1], it must hold that
PH > CH and PH   CH  PL   CL. For ^ 2 [0; 1], it is necessary that PH  P H .
3. Note that a prescription of d = H is rejected with probability . The ex ante payos
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of the expert are
 = (PH   CH) PL   CL
PH   CH + (1  )(PL   CL) = PL   CL (5)
The lemma 3 shows that there indeed exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
the consumer's strategy makes the expert indierent between overtreating and honestly
treating, whilst the expert's strategy makes the consumer indierent between accepting
and rejecting major treatment recommendation.
Lastly, we study the optimal pricing strategy for the expert given the optimal strategies
of both players in continuation game and the following equilibria could be found.
Proposition 1. Under the assumption of liability and veriability, there exists a con-
tinuum of equilibria where the expert posts the price list f P L; P Hg with P H 2 [ P L +CH  
CL; P

H ]. The expert would honestly treat the consumer with major problem while attempt
to overtreat the consumer with minor problem with probability
(U(VS P H)  U)
(1 )( U U(Vm P H))
and hon-
estly treat the consumer with minor problem with probability 1   (U(VS P H)  U)
(1 )( U U(Vm P H))
. The
consumer would accept minor treatment prescription with probability one and major one
with
P L CL
P H CH .
Proof. In lemma 3, the expert's expected payo  = (PL   CL). Obviously, the expert's
expected prots are strictly increasing in PL while constant at PH . Then the expert
should choose the price for minor treatment PL as large as possible while decide the price
for major treatment as long as the consumer would accept.
Since the consumer would accept any pricePL  P L for minor treatment, thus the
optimal price for minor treatment P L = P

L. While for the price of major treatment,
PL   CL  PH   CH gives that P H  CH + PL   CL. Moreover, the highest price that
the consumer is willing to pay for his serious problem repaired is P H , then P

H <
P H .
In brief, P H 2 [ P L + CH   CL; P H ]. Therefore, the optimal price list is f P L; P Hg with
P H 2 [ P L + CH   CL; P H ].
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In proposition 1, both the expert and the consumer play mixed strategy and their
strategy is mutual best response. The expert's overtreatment probability makes the con-
sumer indierent between accepting or rejecting the treatment oer, whilst the consumer's
acceptance probability equate the expert's prots from overtreamtent and honest treat-
ment. We can nd that the expert would overtreat the consumer with strictly positive
probability even when the price margin between two treatment is equal. And the social
eciency can not be achieved. Next, we could investigate how the degree of risk-aversion
of the consumer aect the expert's overtreatment probability.
Corollary 1. Given the price list f P L; P Hg with P H 2 [ P L + CH   CL; P H) in the e-
quilibrium11, the optimal overtreatment probability  is decreasing with the coecient of
absolute risk aversion (CARA). Extremely, when CARA tends toward innity,  = 012.
Proof. Given certain price list f P L; P Hg posted by the expert, the optimal probability of
overtreatment for the expert
 =
(U(VS   P H)  U)
(1  )( U   U(Vm   P H))
=
U(VS   P H) + (1  )U(Vm   P H)  U
(1  )( U   U(Vm   P H))
+ 1
=
U(VS + (1  )Vm   P H   )  U
(1  )( U   U(Vm   P H))
+ 1 (6)
where  denote the certain equivalence that make U(VS + (1   )Vm   P H   ) =
U(VS   P H) + (1   )U(Vm   P H). It have been proved that a larger coecient of
absolute (relative) risk aversion (CARA or CRRA) means larger certainty equivalence13.
Therefore, the more risk-averse the consumer is,  is larger. It is clear to notice that 
is decreasing in , then the result follows.
For the extreme case, when the coecient of absolute risk aversion tends toward
innity, the consumer's expected utility function takes a form of maximin14. Then given
the expert's recommendation for major treatment, the consumer's utility U(PH ; accept) =
11Except the case with the price list f P L; P Hg because the expert would honestly treat the consumer
regardless to the degree of consumer's risk aversion in that case.
12the result still holds when the coecient of absolute risk aversion is replaced by the coecient of
relative risk aversion(CRRA).
13See THEROEM 1 in Pratt (1964) for the proof in details.
14See the Maximin Criterion in chapter 2(Laont (1989)).
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minfU(Vm PH); U(VS PH)g = U(Vm PH)) if the expert overtreats the consumer with
any probability, while U(PH ; accept) = U(VS   PH) if the expert honestly treats. Given
our assumption Vm < CH , then the consumer would always reject the expert's oer if
the expert overtreats the consumer with any, even extremely small, probability because
U(Vm   PH) < U holds for any PH  CH . And the expert's expected prots from the
strategy 1 = (1  )(1  )( P    CH).
On the other hand, if the expert honestly repairs the consumer's problem with U(VS 
PH)  U and PH > CH , the consumer would accept the oer with probability one. Then
the expert's expected prots 2 = (1   )( P    CH) + (P H   CH). Obviously, 2 > 1
and honest treatment is optimal for the expert.
This result is quite interesting, but also intuitive. If the consumer become more risk-
averse, he would obtain less utilities from the uncertain situation, in which the expert
recommends major treatment and overtreats him with some probabilities. Then as long
as the expert overtreats the consumer with any probabilities, the consumer who is more
risk-averse would get less utility from accepting the major treatment recommendation
and therefore become less tolerant with the expert's fraud behaviours, which in turn
on the equilibrium would result in less overtreatments by the expert. Furthermore, if
the consumer is extremely risk-averse and worries about the worst situation, then his
utility function takes a form of max-min, and he would show zero tolerance for the ex-
pert's overtreatment behaviours, which would lead zero acceptance probability for major
treatment if the expert overtreats the consumer with any, even very small, possibilities.
Observing the consumer's strategy, Optimally, the expert would choose not to overtreat
the consumer because the expert could always commit himself to honestly prescribing
major treatment and make a strictly positive prots from major treatment while retain
the same prots from minor treatment. Therefore, the expert would behave honestly if
confronted with a extremely risk-averse consumers.
However, in our model we assume that the consumer's utility function is common
knowledge, and then so is the degree consumer's risk-aversion. In some situations, this
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information might be the consumer's private information and the expert is not informed
about it. We have already shown that the expert's frauds decreases with the consumer's
risk-aversion. Then the consumer of less risk-aversion may have incentive to pretend that
he is much more risk-averse, which induce less frauds for him. If so, then two problems
would arise. One is that how the consumer credibly signals out his degree of risk-averse,
symmetrically the other is that how the expert optimally discriminates the consumer of
dierent degree of risk-aversion. But, these two questions is out the range of this paper.
In the next sections, we extend the basic model by entitling the consumer with insur-
ance option.
3 Analysis with Insurance Option
In the previous section, we have shown that the consumer's utility diers in dierent
states on the equilibrium. If the problem is minor, he would obtain the reserve utility U
when he is not overtreated by the expert with probability 1  , and he would a utility
of U(Vm   PH) < U when he is overtreated with probability . If the problem turns out
to be major, he could gain a utility of U(VM   PH) > U . Thus, the consumer is not fully
insured by the expert. Due to the expert's opportunistic behaviors, the consumer would
obtain a expected utility U(Vm   PH) + (1   ) U < U in the state of minor problem
while one above U if the problem is major. Therefore, the consumer indeed have incentive
to, if he could, purchase insurance from a third party.
As the consumer would obtain a utility below the reserve utility in states of minor
problem while one above reserve utility with major problem, then the problem being
minor is the "bad thing" for the consumer while a major problem is the "good thing".
However, since both the insurer and the consumer can not learn exactly whether the
consumer's problem is minor or major, the insurance could not be based on the states.
But the price list posted by the expert is common knowledge for all, then the insurance
can be based on the price list.
The consumer now is entitled with the insurance option, and we assume that he could
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purchase some insurances provided by the insurance company based on the price list
posted by the expert before he visits the expert. So it implicitly imply that both the
consumer and the insurer observe the price list15. The insurer provide a insurance plan
with (k; ), k denote the price of the insurance or the amount of insurance with unit price
and  means the compensation to the consumer if bad thing happens. After the expert
posts the price list, the insurer determine the insurance scheme (k; ) and afterwards the
consumer decides the optimal quantity of insurance to purchase. Once the treatments
is implemented by the expert and the corresponding price paid by the consumer, if the
consumer is charged with the price for minor treatment by the expert, the insurer would
pay a compensation of  for the consumer, while pay nothing if the consumer being
charged with the price for major treatment, no compensation is paid.
We assume that the insurance market is completely competitive, then the insurer
would make zero expected prots and the insurance is actually fair. After the expert
posts the price list and the insurer posts the insurance plan, the consumer chooses the
amount of insurance to buy. The timing of new game is as follows.
Timing of New Game. The game proceeds as follows:
1. The expert posts a price list (PL; PH).
2. The insurance company provide a actually fair insurance plan (k; ). The consumer
decide to buy k amount of insurance with k  0.
3. Nature draws the consumer's type. The consumer visits the expert. The expert
performs a diagnosis and prescribes a treatment d 2 f?; L;Hg for the consumer.
4. The consumer decides whether accept treatment d or not. If the consumer accepts,
the treatment prescribed would be performed by the expert. If the problem is
15Here we assume that both insurance company and the consumer observe the price list posted by the
expert. The reality can justify the assumption very well. Besides, in our setting, we assume that the
consumer must have a problem, minor or major. It could be easily extended to the case with healthy
consumer but does not change the essence of the problem under concern.
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resolved, the expert receives her payment, otherwise get nothing. The game ends in
other situations.
The notation in the previous section will be retained in the following analysis. Before
solving the game by backward induction, we proclaim that there is no equilibrium in which
the expert posts a single price. Because if the expert indeed posts a single price, then no
insurance scheme is feasible. The insurance option would alter nothing, then the same
argument as that in Lemma 1 which establish no equilibrium with single price applies here
also. Therefore, only price list should be under our concern. We subdivide the analysis
into two cases, one with PL   CL  PH   CH and the other with PL   CL > PH   CH
3.1 PL   CL  PH   CH
Firstly, we study the consumer's optimal acceptance strategy at stage 4. Given the price
list fPL; PHg withPL  CL  PH  CH and k^ amount of insurance purchased in previous
stage, upon recommended minor treatment, accepting the oer would bring a utility
U(d = L; accept) = U(Vm   k^   PL + ^); (7)
while rejecting will reserve U .
On the other hand, the consumer would update his belief about the nature of his
problem as before upon recommended a major treatment. The expert would recommend
major treatment in two situations: one where the consumer's problem is serious; the other
where the expert overtreats the consumer with minor problem, and the probability of the
two situations is  and (1 ), respectively. According to Bayes' rule, the consumer forms
the belief that his problem is minor with probability (1 )
+(1 ) and major with probability

+(1 ) . If the consumer accepts the oer, his expected utility is
U(d = H; accept) =
(1  )U(Vm   k^   PH)
 + (1  ) +
U(VS   k^   PH)
 + (1  ) ; (8)
and,again, rejecting will bring U:
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Denote ^
0
that satisfy U(d = H; accept) = U(d = H; reject),i.e,
(1  )^0U(Vm   k^   PH)
 + (1  )^0 +
U(VS   k^   PH)
 + (1  )^0 =
U; (9)
then simple calculations lead to ^
0
= ((VS k^ PH) 
U)
(1 )( U U(Vm k^ PH)) . Optimally, the consumer would
choose his acceptance probability  = 1 if  < ^
0
,  2 [0; 1] if  = ^0 , and  = 0 if  > ^0 .
Backward, the expert's prescription strategy at stage 3 is the same as that in the
analysis of previous section.
Lemma 4 (Partial Overtreatment). Given the price list fPL; PHg with PL CL  PH CH
and 0  k^  P H   PH , there exists a equilibrium where
1 =
PL   CL
PH   CH ; 

1 =
(U(VS   k^   PH)  U)
(1  )( U   U(Vm   k^   PH))
(10)
and the expert's expected payo 1 = (PL   CL)
Proof. 1. Suppose the posted price list satises PL CL  PH CH . Given r = m, the
expert receives (H) = PL CL by recommending d = L and (F ) = 1(PH  CH)
by recommending d = H. Given the consumer's strategy, (H) = (F ) because
 > 1, then  2 [0; 1] is optimal.
Given the strategies of the expert, declining d = H gets reserve utility U while
accepting d = H brings a utility
U(d = H; accept) =
 
(1  )1U(Vm   k^   PH)
 + (1  )1
+
U(VS   k^   PH)
 + (1  )1
!
= U = U(d = H; reject):
Then any  2 [0; 1] is an optimal strategy for the consumer. Therefore, for the
given price list, the expert's strategy and the consumer's strategy are mutual best
responses.
2. Suppose the strategies in (10) form an equilibrium. For  2 [0; 1], it must hold that
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PH > CH and PH CH  PL CL. For 1 2 [0; 1], it is necessary that k^  P H PH .
3. Note that a prescription of d = H is rejected with probability . The expert's
expected payos are
1 = (PH   CH) PL   CL
PH   CH + (1  )(PL   CL) = PL   CL (11)
Lemma 5 (Optimal Insurance Choice). Given the price list fPL; PHg with PL   CL 
PH   CH and players' strategy in (10), the consumer's optimal insurance choice
k1 = P

H   PH (12)
and then 1 = 0 under the consumer's optimal insurance choice.
Proof. In lemma 5, the consumer's expected utility is
EU(k^; PL; PH) = 

1

U(VS   k^   PH) + (1  )1U(Vm   k^   PH)

+ (1  1)( + (1  )1) U + (1  )(1  1)U(Vm   k^   PL + ^)
= ( + (1  )1) U + (1  )(1  1)U(Vm   k^   PL + ^) (13)
The second equation holds by using denitions of 1. As we assume that the insurance
market is perfectly competitive, free entry will ensure that insurance schemes bought in
equilibrium make zero expected prots, so that if k is purchased,
k   (1  )(1  1) = 0 (14)
then  = k
(1 )(1 1) .
Therefore, the consumer's maximization program subject to the insurer's zero expected
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prot is reduced to
argmax EU(k^; PL; PH)
s:t:  =
k
(1  )(1  1)
; 1 =
(U(VS   k^   PH)  U)
(1  )( U   U(Vm   k^   PH))
(15)
Take both ^ and 1 as a function of k^, denoted as ^(k^) and 

1(k^), respectively. Note that
EU(k^; PL; PH) is dierentiable. By taking partial derivative with respect to k^, we get
@EU
@k^
= (1  )

1
0
[ U   U(Vm   k^   PL + ^)] + (1  1)(^
0   1)U 0(Vm   k^   PL + ^)

(16)
Due to U   U(Vm   k^   PL + ^) < 0 and 01 (k^) < 0, then the rst term in equation
16 is positive. Moreover, ^
0   1 = 1 1+k1
(1 )(1 1)   1 > 0, 

1(k^) 2 [0; 1];  2 [0; 1] and
U
0
() > 0, the last term is also positive. Therefore, @EU(k^;PL;PH)
@k^
> 0. So the consumer's
expected utility is strictly increasing in the amount of insurance k^ purchased. Since
0  k^  P H   PH , the optimal amount of insurance for the consumer lies on the upper
bound,i,e. k1 = P

H   PH .
Lemma 6 (Pricing Strategy). Given the consumer's optimal acceptance strategy and insur-
ance choice, and the expert's optimal prescription strategy in lemma 4 and 5, the expert's
optimal pricing strategy fP L; P Hg is
P L =  P

H+(1 ) P L (CH CL); P H =  P H+(1 ) P L+(1 )(CH CL) (17)
and 1 = 1 and the expert's maximal prot 
 =  P H + (1   ) P L   CH   (1   )CL
under the price list.
Proof. We study the optimal pricing strategy for the price list fPL; PHg with PL  CL 
PH   CH , the expert's prot  = PL   CL, which is strictly monotonically increasing in
PL while invariant to PH .
To ensure that the consumer accepts minor treatment prescription, U(d = m; accept) =
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U(Vm   k +    PL)  U(d = m; reject) = U . Then the optimal PL should make that
U(Vm   k +    P L) = U . Recall that U(Vm   P L) = U , then U(Vm   k +    P L) =
U(Vm   P L). It follows that P L + k    = P L. Given k1 chosen by the consumer, the
expert's optimal overtreatment strategy in lemma 4
1 =
(U(VS   k   PH)  U)
(1  )( U   U(Vm   k^   PH))
=
(U(VS   P H)  U)
(1  )( U   U(Vm   k^   PH))
= 0 (18)
It follows that 1 =
P H PH
(1 )(1 1) =
P H PH
(1 ) . Plugging k
 = P H   PH and  =
P H PH
(1 ) ,
P L = P

L +

1   (
P H   PH): (19)
Furthermore, P L   CL  P H   CH . To maximize PL, P H should take the lower bound,
and P H = P

L+CH CL. Substituting P H into equation 19, then P L =  P H+(1 ) P L 
(CH CL) and P H =  P H+(1 ) P L+(1 )(CH CL). The expert's maximal prots
 = P L   CL =  P H + (1  ) P L   (CH + (1  )CL).
Lastly, given the optimal price list,  = P

L CL
P H CH = 1.
3.2 PL   CL > PH   CH
Lemma 7 (Ecient Outcome). Given the price list fPL; PHg with PL   CL > PH   CH ,
there exists a equilibrium where
2 = 1; 

2 = 0; (20)
and the expert's expected payo 2 = (1  )(PL   CL) + (PH   CH).
Proof. 1. Suppose the posted price list satises PL   CL > PH   CH . since overtreat-
ment is not protable for the expert, then honest treatment is optimal for the
expert,i.e, 2 = 0.
Given that the expert always honestly oer the treatment, the consumer would
always accept the oer, i.e, 2 = 1.
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Therefore, under the given price list, the expert's strategy and the consumer's s-
trategy are mutual best responses.
2. Suppose the strategies in (3) form an equilibrium. For  = 1, it must hold that
PL  P L+ ^  k^ and PH  P H . For  = 0, it is necessary that PL CL > PH  CH .
3. Since the consumer would always accept the recommendation, the expert's expected
payos are
2 = (PH   CH) + (1  )(PL   CL) (21)
Lemma 8 (Optimal Insurance Choice). Given the price list fPL; PHg with PL   CL >
PH   CH and players' strategy in (20), the optimal insurance choice for the consumer
k2 = (1  )(VS   Vm + PL   PH) (22)
Proof. In lemma 8, the consumer's expected utility is
EU = U(VS   k^   PH) + (1  )U(Vm   k^   PL + ^) (23)
As the previous case, given the expert's optimal overtreatment probability 2 on the
equilibrium path, zero expected prot in competitive equilibrium would ensure that
k = (1  )(1  2): (24)
therefore  = k
(1 )(1 2) =
k
1  . Optimally, the consumer maximize his expected utility
subject to the insurer's zero expected prots constraint. As the insurance is actually fair,
the consumer would fully insure for the risk. Then the consumer's optimal insurance
choice is given by
VS   k2   PH = Vm   k2   PL + 2 (25)
Solving k2 by combining this condition and equation (24), k

2 = (1 )(VS Vm+PL PH)
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and 2 = VS   Vm + PL   PH .
Lemma 9 (Pricing Strategy). Given the optimal strategy of both consumer and expert in
lemma 7 and 8, the expert's optimal pricing strategy fP L; P Hg should satisfy
P H + (1  )P L =  P H + (1  ) P L; P L   CL > P H   CH (26)
and the expert's maximal prot 2 =  P

H + (1  ) P L   CH   (1  )CL.
Proof. The expert's prots 2 = PH + (1  )PL   CH   (1  )CL, which are strictly
increasing in both PL and PH . Then the pricing strategy should make the consumer
indierent between accepting and rejecting the recommendation and leave no rents for
the consumer, which gives rise to
PL = 

2   k2 + P L PH = P H   k2 (27)
Plugging k2 and 

2 into the equations, we get PH + (1   )PL =  P H + (1   ) P L.
Essentially, the two conditions in equation 27 are the same. Since the consumer would
always purchase fully insurance, the consumer would retain the same utility in both states
and the dierence of utility between the two states under the price list would be cancelled
out by insurance. Also, the optimal price list should meet the precondition, that is,
P L   CL > P H   CH . The expert's prot follows.
Proposition 2. Under the assumption of liability and veriability, there exists two sets
of equilibria where
1. the expert post a price list fP L; P Hg with P L =  P H+(1 ) P L (CH CL); P H =
 P H+(1 ) P L+(1 )(CH CL), and the consumer purchase a mount of insurance
k1 = (1  )( P H   P L   CH + CL).
2. the expert posts the price list fP L; P Hg with P H + (1   )P L =  P H + (1   ) P L
and P L   CL > P H   CH , the consumer would purchase a mount of insurance
k2 = (1  )(VS   Vm + PL   PH).
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In both sets of equilibria, the expert would honestly treat the consumer in both states, and
the consumer would accept both minor and major treatment with probability one.
Proof. Comparing the expert's payos in lemma 6 and 9, the expert would achieve the
same maximal amount of prots, which is  P H+(1 ) P L CH (1 )CL. Furthermore,
the expert would always honestly treat the consumer and the consumer always accept the
expert's oer,i.e, 1 = 

2 = 1 and 

1 = 

2 = 0. Therefore, both optimal pricing strategies
in lemma 6 and 9 with corresponding optimal strategy in the continuation game form a
equilibrium of the game. And the social eciency could be achieved, the expert would
obtain all the social surplus from the transaction.
From the proposition 2, we show that the social eciency could be achieved under
both situations when the consumer could buy insurance in a competitive insurance market.
The expert's prots is maximized and the consumer's problem is resolved with probability
one. The logic behind the preferable result is that the consumer would fully insure himself
in a competitive market, and then the consumer could always adjust his utility between
the two treatment recommendation. Essentially, the consumer now have only one states
and one utility under whatever the expert recommendation. Then anticipating that the
consumer would buy full insurance, the expert would post the price list that make the
consumer in the state indierent between accepting or rejecting his recommendation,
repair the consumer's problem honestly and grab all surplus at the same time. Therefore,
the equilibrium ends up with the social eciency outcome.
Without insurance option, the consumer could not cross-subsides himself under minor
treatment and major treatment, then his decision under minor treatment and major treat-
ment is separated, and he would only accept the recommendation with expected utility
no lower than his reserve utility under each separate case. While with insurance option,
the consumer could align the two choice into one and save in the good situation for case
of the "bad thing" happening, which induce the consumer not restricted within accep-
tance strategy with respect to the expert's recommendation. the consumer could accept a
treatment with expected utility lower than reserve utility and then receive compensation
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from the insurance company.
When the price list gives rise to more prots from major treatment than minor treat-
ment, corresponding to rst case in the proposition, the expert's prots equal to the price
margin from minor treatment due to the consumer's optimal acceptance probability on
the equilibrium. Then, the expert would charge as much as possible for minor treatment.
If the consumer purchase no insurance, the price for minor treatment maximizes at the
price that leave the consumer with reserve utility after having minor problem repaired.
While now the consumer could buy insurance and he would purchase as much amount
insurance as he can because the insurance could not only alleviate the risk he face but also
mitigate the expert's fraud problem. So the consumer now could receive compensation
from the insurance company when he accept minor treatment, then the price for minor
treatment could be bigger and maximize at the price which makes the consumer indier-
ent between accepting or rejecting the oer with minor problem resolved and receiving
the compensation from the insurance company. Then the expert's optimal price for minor
treatment is that price. But, the amount of insurance the consumer could purchase in
insurance market is constrained by the residuals from having his problem repaired with
major treatment and paying the price for major treatment. In other word, the money
that the consumer could save for the "bad thing" is restricted by the money that he left
when the "good thing" happens. Therefore, the expert could use the insurance that the
consumer purchase as the tool that grab the surplus from major treatment by minor treat-
ment. Since the consumer would fully insurance himself, then the consumer put aside all
his surplus from having major problem repaired for minor treatment. As the compensa-
tion is based on the price paid, then the consumer could not get compensation even when
he is overtreatment, but at same time he has already used all the surplus from having
major problem repaired to purchase insurance, and then the consumer has no tolerance
of overtreatment. The results follows.
As to the second case in the proposition, the argument is similar. The insurance acts
as the tunnel by which the expert could transit the surplus from major treatment to
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minor treatment, and then the expert captures all the surplus with only minor treatment.
Since now all the surplus goes to the expert's pocket, the expert's incentive is aligned
with social eciency and he would post the price list and prescribe to ensure that the
consumer always accepts the treatment. Therefore, social eciency could be realised.
4 Discussions and Conclusions
In the previous sections, we assume that U(VS CH)+(1 )U(Vm CH) < U , then fully
overtreatment is not possible in the equilibrium. While if U(VS  CH) + (1  )U(Vm 
CH)  U , the expert could post a single price P > CH to provide fully insurance for
the consumer. Specically, assume that the expert post a single price P > CH , the
expert would repair consumer's problem, either minor or major, under the single price.
The optimal single price could be set such that U(VS   P ) + (1   )U(Vm   P ) =
U(VS + (1   )Vm   P    ) = U , with  being the certainty equivalence. Then P  =
VS + (1  )Vm   . Under the optimal single price, the consumer would always accept
the expert's recommendation and the expert's prots are maximized as the transaction
could be reached with probability one and all surplus from the transaction is captured by
the expert.
Therefore, cutting down the expert's cost of treatment or improving the expert's pro-
ductivity of treatment to some threshold could avoid the social ineciency induced by
the risk-aversion of consumer when even both liability and veriability assumption holds,
the conditions that the credence goods market can achieve social eciency in Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006) where the consumer is homogeneous and risk-neutral. However, the
expert's cost may dier from each other, some experts are ecient enough while others
may be not16. Furthermore, there always exists some treatments that then the expert is
not ecient enough and the expert could not provide fully insurance for the consumer on
his own. Thus, the situation of our concern in this paper is pretty general.
16We study the impact of expert's heterogeneity of cost on the market performance in details in another
paper.
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Conclusion In this paper, we study the impact of consumer's risk-aversion on the
expert's incentive for overtreatment and the eciency of credence goods market when
both liability and veriability holds in the basic model. Then, we extend the model by
introducing a competitive insurance company, and investigate the consumer's optimal
insurance choices and its eect on the expert's fraud behaviour and social welfare on the
equilibrium.
In the basic model, when both the type of treatment and resolution of consumer's
problem are veriable,i.e, both veriability and liability hold, the consumer's risk aver-
sion would lead to social ineciency and social optimality17 can not be realised on the
equilibrium. Besides, the degree of consumer's risk-aversion aects the expert's overtreat-
ment behaviour. The result shows that the frequency of overtreatment of the expert
decreases with the degree of consumer's risk-aversion or the coecient of absolute risk
aversion. And when the consumer is extremely risk-averse and the consumer's utility func-
tion takes a form of max-min, the expert would return to honestly treat the consumer
and the market is socially ecient.
In the extensive model with insurance company, the consumer now could purchase any
amount of actually fair insurance provided by a competitive insurance company. Social
eciency could always be achieved and the expert would obtain all the social surplus in
the equilibrium. Two sets of equilibrium outcomes divided by expert's pricing strategy
could be specied. When the expert posts a price list with price margin from major
treatment being larger than that from minor treatment, the expert's equilibrium prots
equal to the price margin from minor treatment and the consumer would purchase as much
insurance as possible. Interestingly, the expert could grab all the social surplus facilitated
by the insurance purchased by the consumer, acting as the tunnel that transports the
consumer's surplus from major problem repaired to minor treatment. Optimally, the
consumer's insurance choice would make the expert honestly treat his problem, and in
turn the expert post a optimal price list to capture all the social surplus, and the social
17Here the social optimality means that all the consumer's problem is repaired at minimal cost, that is,
the consumer with minor(major) problem is treated with minor(major) treatment. Then any rejection
from consumer and any overtreatment is not ecient.
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eciency is implemented in the equilibrium.
The other equilibrium outcome relates to the situation where the experts posts a price
list with prots from major treatment being smaller than that of minor treatment. Under
such a price list, the expert credibly commits to honestly repair consumer's problem, and
then the consumer would purchase full insurance and ends up with the same utility level
no matter which type his problem may be. Again, the insurance is a surplus-grabbing
device. Since the consumer would always purchase full insurance, then obtaining all the
surplus in one situation(e.x.minor problem) means getting all the surplus in these two
situation. Therefore, the expert only need post a price list that make the consumer with
minor problem is indierent between accepting and rejecting the treatment oer, and
then obtains all possible surplus. More importantly, the expert indeed has the incentive
to post such a price list as a honesty signal because all possible surplus could be captured
under the price list.
Nevertheless, the results is based on some assumptions. In the model, we assume that
the insurance market is completely competitive, and then the insurance is actually fair. We
anticipate that the market may be not socially ecient any more if the insurance company
have some monopoly power. Intuitively, the consumer would not purchase full insurance
even in the second set of equilibrium outcome above and he would be under-insured.
Although the insurance could still acts as tunnel for the experts, there exists loss of
surplus in the transportation since the insurance company would obtain some consumer's
surplus. Depending on the share captured by the insurance company, committing to
honestly treatment may be not optimal for the expert and the equilibrium outcome is
uncertain.
On the other hand, the consumer may be heterogeneous with respect to risk-aversion.
Our basic model have show that the expert's probability of overtreatment decreases with
the degree of consumer's risk-aversion. With consumer's risk-heterogeneity, the less risk-
averse consumer would have the incentive to pretend to be more risk-averse. This may give
rise to screening problem for the expert. While if the insurance company is in position,
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then risk-heterogeneity may also bring about selection problem for the insurance company.
And it might be interesting to study the fraud problem of expert mingled with the selection
problem. All these problems are interesting while remains unanswered in the literature,
which point out the direction for future researches.
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